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Note
Material Breach, Material Disclosure
Tash Bottum
INTRODUCTION
On September 7, 2017, Equifax announced that its servers
had been breached, compromising the personal financial information of as many as 143 million Americans.1 On that day, the
Equifax stock was trading at $142.72.2 In the week following
Equifax’s announcement, the stock price fell over thirty-three
percent to $92.98.3 Equifax is a credit reporting agency that compiles and sells credit reports comprised of information regarding
an individual’s financial history.4 The company’s database includes information concerning over 820 million consumers, over
91 million businesses, and the employees of over 7100 employers.5 This breach damaged not only the consumers, but also the
company’s investors6 who, at the time, owned over 120 million
outstanding shares.7 As the details of the hack emerged,
 J.D. Candidate 2019, University of Minnesota Law School. Thank you
to Professor Prentiss Cox and Professor John Matheson for their thoughtful
comments and guidance throughout this process. I would also like to thank the
editors and staffers of the Minnesota Law Review for their careful and considerate edits. Thanks also to JGS + P, T, Q, G, S always. Copyright © 2019 by
Tash Bottum.
1. See Thomas Fox-Brewster, A Brief History of Equifax Security Fails,
FORBES (Sept. 8, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2017/09/
08/equifax-data-breach-history/#5ddff05d677c.
2. Equifax, Inc., NYSE, https://www.nyse.com/quote/XXXX:EFX (last visited Mar. 10, 2019).
3. Id.
4. See What Is a Credit Reporting Company?, CFPB, https://www
.consumerfinance.gov/ask-cfpb/what-is-a-credit-reporting-company-en-1251
(last updated May 25, 2017).
5. See Press Release, Equifax, Equifax Releases Details on Cybersecurity
Incident, Announces Personnel Changes (Sept. 15, 2017), https://investor
.equifax.com/news-and-events/news/2017/09-15-2017-224018832.
6. For the purposes of this Note, “investor” or “investors” refers to a company’s shareholders.
7. See Equifax Shares Outstanding, Y CHARTS, https://ycharts.com/
companies/EFX/shares_outstanding (last updated Oct. 31, 2017).
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Equifax’s ethics and conduct became increasingly concerning to
both the company’s investors and the general public.
The untimeliness of Equifax’s response—a critical component of data breach investigations—deepened these concerns.8
Equifax first discovered the data breach on July 29, 2017.9 However, the roots of this story trace back further. On March 8, 2017,
security researchers at Cisco Systems, Inc. discovered a vulnerability in the Apache software used by Equifax.10 Apache Software Foundation issued a patch to cure this vulnerability, and
instructed companies to take necessary efforts to protect their
systems.11 On May 13, hackers first accessed sensitive information within Equifax’s databases.12 The hackers entered
through the same vulnerability that the Apache-issued patch
was intended to repair.13 When Equifax discovered the breach,
they patched the vulnerability,14 but at that point, the damage
had been done.
From July 29 until September 7, Equifax internally reviewed the breach and enlisted an independent cybersecurity
firm, Mandiant, to assist in determining “the scope of the intrusion, including the specific data impacted.”15 Thus, it was not
until forty days after Equifax first discovered the breach that the
company disclosed the event to the public and to its investors.
During this forty-day delay, company executives within
Equifax sold nearly $2 million worth of shares.16 Regulatory fil-

8. See Stephanie Yonekura et al., Mitigating and Investigating a Cybersecurity Incident, GLOBAL INVESTIGATIONS REV. (Aug. 8, 2016), https://
globalinvestigationsreview.com/insight/the-investigations-review-of-the
-americas-2017/1067470/mitigating-and-investigating-a-cybersecurity-incident
(explaining that the date that the incident was discovered, confirmed, and disclosed will have an impact on whether the company’s response will be perceived
as reasonable).
9. See Press Release, Equifax, supra note 5 (stating that on July 29, 2017,
the company first detected suspicious activity on its servers).
10. See AnnaMaria Andriotis & Robert McMillan, Hackers Entered Equifax
Systems in March, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 20, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
hackers-entered-equifax-systems-in-march-1505943617.
11. See id.
12. See id.
13. Lily Hay Newman, Equifax Officially Has No Excuse, WIRED (Sept. 14,
2017), https://www.wired.com/story/equifax-breach-no-excuse/.
14. See Press Release, Equifax, supra note 5.
15. Id.
16. See AnnaMaria Andriotis, Equifax Special Committee Clears Executives
on Trades Before Breach Disclosure, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 3, 2017), https://www

2019]

MATERIAL BREACH & DISCLOSURE

2097

ings show that Chief Financial Officer, John Gamble; U.S. Information Solutions President, Joseph Loughran; and Workforce
Solutions President, Rodolfo Ploder; completed stock sales on
August 1 and August 2, totaling roughly $1.8 million worth of
shares.17 These transactions may not have been planned, as they
were not listed on the company’s scheduled trading plan.18
Equifax—as well as a committee of the company’s board of directors assembled to investigate these trades—stated the executives were unaware of the breach at the time of the trades.19
Later investigations revealed that an additional executive—the
now-former Chief Information Officer, Jun Ying—sold nearly
one million shares after learning of the breach.20 Ying remains
the only executive charged with insider trading in connection
with this breach.21 Nonetheless, all of the executives’ trades mitigated their financial harm, as the trades occurred in the wake
of a breach which would later damage the remainder of the company’s investors, large and small.
The Equifax breach is believed to be “one of the most significant data breaches given the scope of the information disclosed”22 and the resulting damage to consumers and investors.23

.wsj.com/articles/equifax-special-committee-clears-executives-on-trades-before
-breach-disclosure-1509715006.
17. Id.
18. See Alina Selyukh, 3 Equifax Executives Sold Stock Days After Hack
That Wasn’t Disclosed for a Month, NPR (Sept. 8, 2017), https://www.npr.org/
sections/thetwo-way/2017/09/08/549434187/3-equifax-executives-sold-stock
-days-after-hack-that-wasnt-disclosed-for-a-month. A scheduled trading plan
establishes pre-planned buying and selling of shares for a certain period of time.
See JAMES R. TANENBAUM & BRIAN HIRSHBERG, MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP,
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT RULE 10B5-1 PLANS 2 (2017). These
plans are “especially useful” for insiders presumed to have nonpublic information, “such as officers, directors and other affiliates,” and must be submitted
in accordance with federal regulations. Id.
19. See Andriotis, supra note 16 (describing the committee’s investigation
and findings); see also Press Release, Equifax, Equifax Board Releases Findings
of Special Committee Regarding Stock Sale by Executives (Nov. 3, 2017), https://
investor.equifax.com/news-and-events/news/2017/11-03-2017-124511096.
20. See Stacy Cowley, Ex-Equifax Executive Charged with Insider Trading
Tied to ‘17 Breach, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 14, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/
2018/03/14/business/equifax-executive-insider-trading.html.
21. Id.
22. Andriotis & McMillan, supra note 10.
23. See generally The Equifax Breach: An Overview, CYBERWIRE NEWS,
https://www.thecyberwire.com/articles/the-equifax-breach-an-overview.html
(last updated Sept. 20, 2017) (stating that while the Equifax breach is not the
largest to have occurred, “it may be among the most damaging in effect”).
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Following Equifax’s September 7 announcement, public attention has focused predominantly on consumer harm, demonstrated, for example, by a fifty-state class action lawsuit alleging, among other things, that Equifax delayed informing
consumers about the breach, thereby preventing them from mitigating the impending damage.24 This Note shifts the focus to
the company’s shareholders—a group of individuals who entrusted Equifax with their money, and whose investments must
pay for the damage the company caused. As of the time of this
writing, Equifax’s stock price has yet to recover to the preannouncement price.25 Thus, the shareholders continue to be
harmed. Regardless of whether the extent of such harm could
have been mitigated, the damage resulting from the Equifax
data breach is material.
While Equifax stands in the spotlight, it is not alone in its
misfortune. In today’s age of technology, companies dedicate
vast resources to protecting incredible amounts of data and the
focus on cybersecurity is rapidly increasing in all industries.26
This focus, in large part, is a reflection of the risk that content
data breaches present. For the purposes of this Note, a “content
data breach” is defined as a data breach that has compromised
at least 1000 records containing consumers’ personally identifiable information.27 As the Equifax content data breach demonstrates, this type of breach negatively impacts the company’s
stock price, and in turn, its investors.28 These harms then trigger
federal law.

24. See, e.g., id. (discussing the implications of this breach on individuals’
privacy); Kenneth R. Harney, Data Breach at Equifax Prompts a National
Class-Action Suit, WASH. POST (Nov. 22, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost
.com/realestate/data-breach-at-equifax-prompts-a-national-class-action-suit/
2017/11/20/28654778-ce19-11e7-a1a3-0d1e45a6de3d_story.html?noredirect=
on&utm_term=.38df7b6f9a3a (describing the lawsuit); Adam Shell, Equifax
Data Breach: Number of Victims May Never Be Known, USA TODAY (Sept. 17,
2017), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2017/09/17/equifax-data-breach
-number-victims-may-never-known/670618001 (“Countless Americans will no
doubt suffer financial harm from the Equifax data breach.”).
25. See Equifax, Inc., supra note 2 (providing a real-time value of the stock).
26. See infra note 178 and accompanying text.
27. See discussion infra Part III.A. This definition borrows its numeric
threshold from a Ponemon Institute study that examines data breaches.
PONEMON INST., 2017 COST OF DATA BREACH STUDY 2 (2017) [hereinafter
PONEMON STUDY]; see also infra notes 217–18 and accompanying text.
28. See infra Part III.B.
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Corporate disclosure law requires companies to report certain types of events on a current basis.29 The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) disclosure regulations are currently
governed by a vague standard of materiality that fails to adequately guide companies in determining whether to disclose a
breach.30 While often beneficial,31 the discretion that the materiality standard allows is inappropriate as it applies to reporting
content data breaches. Disclosure law aims to promote transparency, enhance informed investments, and protect investors.32
The materiality standard harms investors by decreasing corporate transparency. A breach harms investors by decreasing the
share price. These harms offend the purposes of federal disclosure law.33 Moreover, the rate and effects of data breaches has
risen at an alarming rate, reaching a level that demands regulatory attention.34 This Note proposes a new rule in lieu of applying a standard to reporting content data breaches. This new rule
will clarify the existing ambiguity, requiring disclosure where
the standard simply recommends disclosure. The Note argues
that companies must disclose content data breaches within four
days of discovery by means of the SEC’s 8-K disclosure form—
specifically, Item 2.06: Material Impairments.35
This Note proceeds as follows. Part I describes the recent
boom of data breaches and a breach’s potential effects and costs
before tracing the origin of SEC disclosure requirements, the
purpose of such requirements, and the development of the SEC
framework relating to corporate disclosures. This Part also sets
forth the most common standard for materiality in corporate disclosure law. Part II discusses the distinction between a standard
and a rule, identifies the use of standards and rules in the context of corporate disclosure law, and proposes that content data
breaches should be subject to a rule—rather than a standard—
of materiality. This Part describes the immediate justifications
of subjecting content data breaches to a bright-line rule that requires four-day disclosure through the SEC’s Form 8-K. Finally,
Part III explores the particulars of the proposed rule and its benefits and demonstrates that mandatory disclosure satisfies the
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
8-K].

See infra Part I.B.
See infra Part III.C.
See infra Part I.D.
See infra Part I.A.
See infra Part III.B.
See infra Part II.C.
SEC, CURRENT REPORT (FORM 8-K), at 2 (2018) [hereinafter FORM
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original purposes of corporate disclosure law. Finally, this Part
addresses the most prominent critique of this rule-based approach—the speculative nature of content data breaches, and
the resulting difficulty in precise reporting—before concluding.
I. DATA BREACHES AND THE HISTORY OF SEC
DISCLOSURE LAW
Content data breaches are a relatively new phenomenon
and have recently gained widespread attention.36 Company disclosure requirements, on the other hand, were established early
on in disclosure law and are a central consideration of corporations today. This Part traces the recent upsurge in data breaches
and the effects that a breach can have on a company. Next, it
traces the enactment and development of SEC-required disclosures, the purposes that Congress and the SEC intended to protect through the relevant legislation, regulations, and amendments, and finally, the touchstone materiality standard used
throughout corporate disclosure law.
A. THE RISE AND EFFECTS OF DATA BREACHES
Regulations governing corporate disclosures have been dynamic, aiming to serve the purposes of the Exchange Act, subsequent legislation, shifting shareholder interests, and market developments. The rise of technology, and electronically stored
information (ESI) in recent years is a critical market change,
presenting new threats and risks to companies of all sizes.37 One
such threat is a content data breach,38 such as the Equifax data
breach that was described in the Introduction. The number of
reported breaches has increased at an alarming rate since the
early 2000s,39 with over 1000 breaches tracked in 2016 alone—a
36. See, e.g., Juliana De Groot, The History of Data Breaches, DIGITAL
GUARDIAN: DATAINSIDER (Jan. 3, 2019), https://digitalguardian.com/blog/
history-data-breaches (stating that the frequency of publicly-disclosed data
breaches increased in the 1980s, with public awareness beginning to rise in the
early 2000s).
37. See, e.g., De Groot, supra note 36 (explaining that the exponential
growth of ESI provides a greater opportunity for cyber criminals to gain access
through a breach).
38. See Data Breach, TREND MICRO, https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/
security/definition/data-breach (last visited Mar. 10, 2019) (defining a data
breach as “an incident where information is stolen or taken from a system without the knowledge or authorization of the system’s owner”).
39. See De Groot, supra note 36. (noting an increase from 157 breaches reported in 2005 to 783 breaches in 2014).
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forty percent increase over the previous year’s number.40 Data
breaches have short-term and long-term effects, leaving a path
of destruction in their wake.
Recent studies have demonstrated that data breaches negatively impact the stock share price of a company at the moment
of public announcement with years of lasting effects.41 In 2017,
Comparitech conducted a study focusing on Wall Street’s reaction to a data breach, identifying twenty-four previously
breached companies, including Apple, Adobe Systems, eBay,
Home Depot, JPMorgan, LinkedIn, Target, and Yahoo.42 Comparitech examined each of the company’s share prices prior to
and after its public announcement of the incident, finding that a
data breach has more of a long-term effect than an immediate
one.43 The companies’ share prices only fell about 0.5% on average immediately following a breach.44 Three years after the
breach, however, the stocks had dropped 41.6% in comparison to
the NASDAQ market performance.45 Comparitech’s study also
40. See Data Breaches Increase 40 Percent in 2016, Finds New Report from
Identity Theft Resource Center and CyberScout, IDENTITY THEFT RESOURCE
CTR., http://www.idtheftcenter.org/2016databreaches (Jan. 19, 2017) (noting
1091 reported breaches in 2016, as compared to 780 in 2015).
41. See Marc Butler, Data Breaches Have Measurable Impact on Long-Term
Stock Prices, INTELLIGIZE (July 20, 2017), https://www.intelligize.com/data
-breaches-measurable-impact-long-term-stock-prices (arguing that new research and studies show that “there is indeed a measurable impact [of data
breaches] on short- and long-term stock value”). But see Elena Kvochko & Rajiv
Pant, Why Data Breaches Don’t Hurt Stock Prices, HARV. BUS. REV. (Mar. 31,
2015), https://hbr.org/2015/03/why-data-breaches-dont-hurt-stock-prices (arguing that even significant breaches have “very little impact” on the company’s
stock price).
42. Paul Bischoff, Analysis: How Data Breaches Affect Stock Market Share
Prices, COMPARITECH (July 11, 2017), https://www.comparitech.com/blog/
information-security/data-breach-share-price. In particular, the study focused
on three concerns: (1) the immediate effect of a data breach on closing share
price compared to daily volatility; (2) the percent difference in closing share
price performance versus the S&P 500 over the same period of time from the
day prior to a breach; and (3) the recovery time for that percent change to return
to zero or greater. Id.
43. The study used NASDAQ’s market performance as a baseline, rather
than zero. Id. For example, if NASDAQ rose 2% and a company’s stock rose 1%,
the study would find a 1% decrease in that company’s stock performance versus
the market. If, however, NASDAQ fell 2% and a company’s stock rose 2%, the
study would find a 4% increase in that company’s stock performance versus the
market. Id.
44. The one-half percent drop was found to be within the standard deviation for daily volatility, rendering it statistically insignificant. Id. One year after
the breach, the twenty-four companies’ stocks underperformed NASDAQ by
7.33% on average. Id.
45. Id.
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found negative long-term effects in the postbreach growth rate
relative to the prebreach growth rate. While companies’ share
prices ultimately continued to increase following a data breach,
postbreach growth, averaging 14.8%, was minute in comparison
to prebreach growth, which averaged 45.6%.46 While this study
examined only significant data breaches,47 it found that the
smallest analyzed breaches—those with a lower number of records compromised—impacted share prices the most.48 This
demonstrates that a breach does not need to be of equal magnitude to the Equifax breach in order to harm shareholders. Ultimately, the described decrease in market value resulting from a
content data breach damages shareholders.49
Additionally, data breaches result in both direct and indirect
costs to the company, restricting its ability to grow in directions
in which it otherwise would have been capable.50 A data breach
in the United States costs $7.35 million on average, which in
turn, impacts a company’s profitability.51 For example, Equifax
risks spending over $100 million dollars in costs,52 in addition to
46. The study looked at share price growth in the three years prior to and
three years after a data breach. Id.
47. In order to qualify for the study, the company must have: (1) been publicly listed, preferably on the New York Stock Exchange; (2) experienced a
breach affecting one million or more records; and (3) publicly disclosed the
breach. Id.
48. These breaches impacted 1–10 million company records and resulted in
a 2% initial drop, 21-day recovery, and 5.91% subsequent drop 165 days after
the breach. Id. The study also analyzed the companies’ stock prices based on
time of breach, the companies’ industries, and sensitivity of stolen information.
Id.; see also David Ruiz, Data Breaches Have Lingering Effect on Stock Prices,
Study Says, LAW.COM: CORP. COUNS. (July 11, 2017), https://www.law.com/
corpcounsel/sites/corpcounsel/2017/07/11/data-breaches-have-lingering-effect
-on-stock-prices-study-says (discussing the Comparitech study and summarizing its results).
49. See Press Release, SEC, Statement on Cybersecurity (Sept. 20, 2017),
https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2017-170 (stating that one of the risks
associated with a data breach is “investor losses resulting from the theft of funds
or market value declines in companies subject to cyberattacks”).
50. See Michael Peters, Post Equifax, New Data Breach Notification Laws
Are Inevitable, SECURITY BOULEVARD (Jan. 10, 2018), https://securityboulevard
.com/2018/01/post-equifax-new-data-breach-notification-laws-are-inevitable
(quoting SEC Chairman, Jay Clayton, stating that cyber breaches are “one of
the greatest risks to the financial system right now”). See generally Emily Mossburg et al., The Hidden Costs of an IP Breach, 19 DELOITTE REV. 106, 118 (2016)
(arguing that due to the “importance to growth market share, and innovation . . . cyber risk should rightly sit with other strategic initiatives managed at
the C-suite level”).
51. PONEMON STUDY, supra note 27, at 5, 10.
52. Mike Lennon, Equifax: Hack Related Expenses Cost Company $87.5
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facing a multibillion-dollar lawsuit.53 First, a data breach results
in direct costs,54 such as those related to engaging a forensic expert or cybersecurity firm to investigate the breach55 and improving security measures moving forward.56 For example, to
thoroughly investigate and report its breach, Equifax incurred
$17.1 million in professional fees.57 Additionally, a company will
often engage outside counsel to manage the expected litigation.58
Finally, breached companies offer identity protection services
and remedial options to its consumer base.59 For example,
Equifax announced three postbreach consumer protection offerings to mitigate consumer harm,60 including credit monitoring,61
freezing services,62 and a “credit lock” tool.63 These offerings will
Million in Q3, SECURITY WK. (Nov. 9, 2017), https://www.securityweek.com/
equifax-hack-related-expenses-cost-company-875-million-q3.
53. See Polly Mosendz, Equifax Faces Multibillion-Dollar Lawsuit over
Hack, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 8, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2017-09-08/equifax-sued-over-massive-hack-in-multibillion-dollar-lawsuit (describing a class action against Equifax by over 143 million consumers).
54. See PONEMON STUDY, supra note 27, at 29 (defining direct costs as “the
direct expense outlay to accomplish a given activity”).
55. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, DATA BREACH RESPONSE: A GUIDE FOR BUSINESS 1 (2016) [hereinafter FTC REPORT] (instructing companies to identify an
independent data forensics team to help determine the source and scope of the
breach, analyze the collected evidence, and advise on remediation steps).
56. Contra Erik Sherman, The Reason Companies Don’t Fix Cybersecurity,
CBS (Feb. 13, 2016), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/the-reason-companies
-dont-fix-cybersecurity (suggesting the return is not worth large companies’ investments in data protection measures, because the losses are small compared
to the revenue of these corporate “behemoth[s]”).
57. Lennon, supra note 52.
58. FTC REPORT, supra note 55, at 1 (instructing companies to consult with
in-house attorneys before hiring outside counsel with privacy and data security
expertise who may advise on applicable law and requirements). But see BRYAN
CAVE, 2017 DATA BREACH LITIGATION REPORT 3 (2017) (finding that due to
standing issues for the plaintiff, the risk that a company will face litigation following a data breach is relatively low).
59. See, e.g., Lily Hay Newman, Can Equifax’s Offerings Actually Protect
Your Identity?, WIRED (Sept. 30, 2017), https://www.wired.com/story/equifax
-identity-protection-offerings (quoting the founder of data security and privacy
firm CyberScout, Adam Levin, as saying “[i]n the event something goes
wrong, . . . companies need to respond urgently, transparently, and empathetically”).
60. See id. (describing and discussing Equifax’s response measures).
61. A credit-monitoring service sends an individual an alert so he or she
may catch suspicious activity earlier than later. Id.
62. A freezing service locks down an individual’s credit files that requires
new entities to get specific permission and pin numbers from the individual before accessing his or her information for the first time. Id.
63. A “credit lock” tool allows consumers to lock and unlock access to their
data at any time. Id.
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cost Equifax approximately $14.9 million.64 Nonetheless,
breached companies often institute these services and options in
the hopes of increasing consumer retention and its general public perception.65
Customer retention and public perception themselves are
among the indirect costs66 of a data breach.67 A breach can
greatly harm consumer and shareholder trust, which culminates
in decreased customer attainment and retention, and ultimately
a devaluation of the brand itself.68 Recent studies have found
that the average loss to brand value following a data breach
ranged from $184 to $332 million.69 A further indirect cost is lost
business,70 a term which encompasses not only “reputation
losses and diminished goodwill,” but also broader costs.71 These
broader costs include increased difficulty in attracting new customers72 and loss of intellectual property and trade secrets.73
When a company loses its intellectual property and trade secrets, its competitive edge is compromised.74 The company may
64. Lennon, supra note 52.
65. See Why Companies Should Offer Post-Breach Monitoring Services, EXPERIAN (Aug. 4, 2017), http://www.experian.com/blogs/data-breach/2017/08/04/
companies-offer-post-breach-monitoring-services (finding that companies who
successfully help consumers results in better retention and prevents losing consumers to the competition).
66. See PONEMON STUDY, supra note 27, at 29 (defining indirect costs as
“the amount of time, effort[,] and other organizational resources allocated to
data breach resolution, but not as a direct cash outlay”).
67. See id. at 22 (measuring “reputation losses and diminished goodwill”).
68. See The Consequences of a Cyber Security Breach, SUNGARD AVAILABILITY SERVICES., https://www.sungardas.com/en/cyber-security-advice/articles/
the-consequences-of-a-cyber-security-breach.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2019).
69. PONEMON INST., 2011 REPUTATION IMPACT OF A DATA BREACH 1 (2011).
But see Sherman, supra note 56 (stating that “[n]ew customer acquisition can
be a problem, but probably not a permanent one,” and claiming that the public’s
perception is back to normal within six months of a breach).
70. See PONEMON STUDY, supra note 27, at 22 (finding that the average lost
business cost over a period of twelve years was $4.13 million).
71. PONEMON INST., 2011, supra note 69.
72. See 86% of Customers Would Shun Brands Following a Data Breach,
SEMAFONE (Mar. 2014), https://semafone.com/press-releases/86-customers
-shun-brands-following-data-breach (finding that eighty-six percent of survey
participants either were very unlikely to or would not do business with a company that had previously experienced a data breach involving financial information).
73. Mossburg et al., supra note 50, at 108.
74. Id. (suggesting that while there are fewer upfront, direct costs, “losing
IP could mean forfeiture of first-to-market advantage, loss of profitability, or—
in the worst case—losing entire lines of business to competitors or counterfeiters”).
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not realize the extent of the resulting competitive disadvantage
until much later, after observing that several “strategies fail to
yield positive results.”75 This risk is particularly pronounced
when a company, such as Equifax, does not discover the breach
for an extended period of time.76
These types of damages and harms that result from data
breaches are of the type that prompted Congress to create a federal disclosure regime and a governing agency to ensure compliance. The remainder of this Part details this regime.
B. PURPOSE AND PROCEDURES OF THE 1933 AND 1934
SECURITIES ACT
Each shareholder holds a right to future cash flow of the corporation.77 This right, in turn, creates an interest in the company. Until 1933, effective market regulation was nonexistent
and market information was rarely available to the individual
investor as a result.78 Individuals nonetheless continued investing until the unprecedented market crash in 1929.79 In 1933,
President Franklin Roosevelt urged Congress to adopt measures
to regulate the national securities market, a move which would
be “but one step in [its] broad purpose of protecting investors.”80
The Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act) and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act) reflected this desire to protect
investors and to promote efficiency.81 The Securities Act requires
75. 3 Long Term-Data Breach Consequences, GLOBALSCAPE (Nov. 11, 2013),
https://www.globalscape.com/blog/2013/11/11/3-long-termdata-breach
-consequences.
76. See supra notes 9, 11, and accompanying text (stating that Equifax first
discovered the data breach on July 29, 2017, though the hackers first began
accessing information on May 13, 2017).
77. See, e.g., Michael J. Mauboussin, What Shareholder Value Is Really
About, HARV. BUS. REV. (Oct. 3, 2011), https://hbr.org/2011/10/ceos-must
-understand-what-crea (stating that investors essentially make “short-term
bets on long-term outcomes,” while explaining that the “value of the business is
the present value of future cash flows”).
78. See Giulio Pontecorvo, Investment Banking and Security Speculation in
the Late 1920’s, 32 BUS. HIST. REV. 166, 168 (1958) (stating that the “American
capital market in the 1920’s was still independent of any significant constraints
on freedom of action” both from governmental entities and large institutional
investors); see also What We Do, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/Article/whatwedo
.html (last updated June 10, 2013) (explaining that prior to 1929, there was
“little support for federal regulation of the securities markets”).
79. See Gene Smiley, US Economy in the 1920s, EH.NET ENCYCLOPEDIA
(2004), https://eh.net/encyclopedia/the-u-s-economy-in-the-1920s.
80. See H.R. REP. NO. 73-1383, at 2 (1934).
81. See Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(f ) (2012); see also H.R.
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companies to register publicly-offered securities, which Congress
hoped would enable investors to make more informed business
judgments.82 The Exchange Act established the SEC83 and
granted it power to provide for periodic reporting requirements
in order to supplement an investor’s ability to form a well-reasoned judgment of the value of securities he or she buys and
sells.84 This legislation granted the SEC broad authority, allowing the agency to promulgate rules and regulations to achieve
the Exchange Act’s purpose: protecting investors and enhancing
transparency to allow for informed investments.85
The SEC has used its broad discretion to create an elaborate
scheme of disclosure requirements, which apply to most U.S.
public companies. For example, the SEC mandates that publicly
traded companies file quarterly reports, or 10-Qs, which include
information regarding stock repurchases, inventory turnover,
changes in working capital, and potential legal risks, such as
lawsuits.86 SEC rules and regulations have evolved throughout
over time in response to the purpose of the Exchange Act, shifting investor interests, and external events that make certain information more relevant to a company’s shareholders. This approach is consistent with Congress’s original intent to create a

REP. NO. 73-1383, at 2 (explaining that the Act was intended to rectify the dangerous speculation of securities that characterized the 1920s). The Committee
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce attributed this “excessive” speculation primarily to “inadequate corporate reporting,” which resulted in investor ignorance
of critical factors necessary for “intelligent judgment of the values of securities.”
Id. at 4–5.
82. See The Laws That Govern the Securities Industry, SEC, https://www
.sec.gov/answers/about-lawsshtml.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2019). This mandatory registration form requires companies to disclose: (1) a description of the
company’s properties and business; (2) a description of the security to be offered
for sale; (3) information about the management of the company; and (4) financial statements certified by independent accountants. Id.; see also 15 U.S.C.
§ 77g (establishing requirements for SEC registration).
83. See 15 U.S.C. § 77g.
84. See H.R. REP. NO. 73-1383, at 6.
85. See id. at 6–7 (recognizing that an administrative agency is best suited
to adopt regulations in a field such as securities where “practices constantly
vary”).
86. See Joshua Kennon, Annual Reports, 10-Ks, and 10-Qs, THE BALANCE
(June 29, 2017), https://www.thebalance.com/annual-reports-10k-10q-357266.
This form provides investors with information that “give[s] insight into changes
that are happening in a business long before those changes show up in the earnings figures.” Id.
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stable and efficient market, which will, in turn, attract further
investment to fuel growth.87
C. AMENDMENTS TO AND EXPANSIONS OF THE 1933 AND 1934
ACT
Shareholder interests are an influential factor in SEC rulemaking. In some instances, lack of shareholder interest has been
influential in the SEC’s decision not to impose additional disclosure requirements. For example, in 1975, the SEC concluded
that disclosure related to social-policy interests was not necessary.88 In so deciding, the agency noted that corporations had not
received a significant number of social inquiries from their
shareholders, and further, that the few shareholder proposals
relating to social policy had received extremely low shareholder
support.89 In other instances, shareholder interest has prompted
the SEC to impose additional requirements. In the wake of the
2008 financial crisis, the SEC amended its rules in 2009, providing investors with greater insight as to how managers of corporations oversee risk taking.90 The agency promulgated the
amendments in response to investors’ increased focus on corporate accountability and “desire for additional information that
would enhance their ability to make informed voting and investment decisions.”91

87. See Eric D. Roiter, Illegal Corporate Practices and the Disclosure Requirements of the Federal Securities Laws, 50 FORDHAM L. REV. 781, 784–85
(1982) (summarizing the “subsidiary” purposes of the Exchange Act as (1) improved pricing mechanisms resulting from informed investor assessments; (2)
enhanced investor confidence, leading to increased stability and greater infusions of capital for industry and commerce; and (3) deterrence of corporate misconduct); see also H.R. REP. NO. 73-1383, at 11 (“The idea of a free and open
public market is built upon the theory that competing judgments of buyers and
sellers as to the fair price of a security brings about a situation where the market price reflects as nearly as possible a just price.”).
88. See Environmental and Social Disclosure, 40 Fed. Reg. 51,656, 51,656
(proposed Nov. 6, 1975) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 239, 240, 249); cf. Barnali
Choudhury, Social Disclosure, 13 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 183, 195–98 (2016) (discussing whether social disclosure requirements—disclosures that are related to
social issues—help or harm shareholder interests in today’s marketplace).
89. Environmental and Social Disclosure, 40 Fed. Reg. at 51,664 (noting a
two to three percent voting approval on these issues in recent years).
90. See Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, 74 Fed. Reg. 68,334, 68,334 (Dec.
23, 2009) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 229, 239, 240, 249, 274).
91. Id. The SEC stated that investors supported “the manner in which [the
SEC] proposed to achieve these objectives,” and ultimately adopted the amendments, despite opposition from “other commentators.” Id. at 68,335.
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Additionally, the SEC has adopted rules in response to external events or societal changes that render particular information more important to shareholders. The SEC’s 2009 amendments, promulgated in response to external events such as the
2008 financial crisis92 and the passing of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
in 2002, demonstrate this flexibility.93 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act,
itself, added new and expanded existing disclosure requirements
that would provide greater investor protection.94 The enactment
of this Act was largely due to Enron’s unexpected filing for bankruptcy, demonstrating Congress’s desire to regulate in response
to events affecting the economy95—such as content data
breaches—thus, endorsing the SEC’s choice to do the same. Additionally, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act further expanded the SEC’s
resources and authority to effectively regulate in the face of the
securities market’s “unprecedented growth and change.”96
D. FORM 8-K AND ITS 2004 EXPANSION
In 2004, the SEC invoked its authority to widen the scope of
Form 8-K, a form used to notify investors of specified events on
a periodic basis.97 Form 8-K allows companies to release infor-

92. See Proxy Disclosure and Solicitation Enhancements, 74 Fed. Reg.
35,076, 35,080 (July 17, 2009) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 229, 239, 240, 249, 270,
274) (explaining that volatility in stock price, “such as the significant decreases
during 2008” affect total compensation, thus demonstrating that disclosure requirements relating to compensation policies are necessary).
93. Id. at 35,083 (explaining that “developments, such as the enactment of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and corporate-governance related listing standards . . . have brought about significant changes in the structure and composition of corporate boards” thus demonstrating that disclosure requirements related to director qualifications are necessary).
94. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections of 15, 18, and 28 U.S.C.).
95. See S. REP. NO. 107-205, at 29 (2002) (“This Committee recognizes from
the recent experience of Enron Corp. and other public companies the need for
additional types of disclosures.”). The Report references testimony of the former
SEC Chairman, Richard Breeden, following the Enron scandal, in which he
urges additional disclosure requirements for “off-balance sheet transactions and
debt.” Id. at 28 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
96. Id. at 40.
97. FORM 8-K, supra note 35; see also Additional Form 8-K Disclosure Requirements and Acceleration of Filing Date, 67 Fed. Reg. 42,914, 42,914 (June
25, 2002) [hereinafter Proposed 2002 Rule] (providing that the SEC created
Form 8-K in 1936, “as the form to be used by companies to file ‘current’ reports
when specific extraordinary corporate events occur” (citing Release No. 34-925
(Nov. 11, 1936))).
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mation that the Exchange Act, and other rules promulgated pursuant to this Act, require companies to disclose.98 For example,
Regulation Fair Disclosures (FD) requires companies to make
market-sensitive information available to all parties—including
institutional investors, individual investors, and the general
public—at the same time.99 A company may fulfill this requirement with an 8-K filing containing such market-sensitive information.100
The 2004 Final Rule (the 2004 Rule) expanded the number
of reportable events on Form 8-K.101 Specifically, the 2004 Rule
added eight new items to the form, transferred two items from
the periodic reports, and expanded disclosures under two items
on the former Form 8-K.102 Additionally, the 2004 Rule reorganized the disclosure items into topical categories and shortened the filing deadline to four business days after the occurrence of a triggering event.103 Ultimately, these changes
increased Form 8-K’s power to facilitate timely communication
between a company and its shareholders, as well as the public.
Indeed, the amendments were a response to the ‘real time issuer
disclosure’ mandate in Section 409 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002,104 and are intended to benefit investors.105 The SEC explained:

98. FORM 8-K, supra note 35.
99. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716,
51,718 (Aug. 24, 2000) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 243, 249).
100. FORM 8-K, supra note 35, at 2 (stating that Form 8-K “shall be used
for . . . reports of nonpublic information required to be disclosed by Regulation
FD” and that the form “satisfies all the substantive requirements” of the FD
regulation).
101. See Additional Form 8-K Disclosure Requirements and Acceleration of
Filing Date, 69 Fed. Reg. 15,594, 15,594 (Mar. 25, 2004) (codified at 17 C.F.R.
pts. 228, 229, 230, 239, 240, 249) [hereinafter 2004 Rule]; see also Proposed 2002
Rule, supra note 97, at 42,914 (stating the then-current Form 8-K requirements
as including nine disclosure items and a five-day filing deadline). See generally
17 C.F.R. § 249.308 (2018) (providing that Form 8-K will be used for “current
reports”).
102. 2004 Rule, supra note 101, at 15,596.
103. See id.; cf. Proposed 2002 Rule, supra note 97, at 42,914 (stating that
the former filing deadline was five days). The 2004 Rule additionally adopts a
limited “safe harbor” provision from liability for failure to timely file a Form 8K for certain items. 2004 Rule, supra note 101, at 15,606.
104. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 409, 116 Stat. 745
(codified in scattered sections of 15, 18, and 28 U.S.C.) (requiring “rapid and
current” disclosure of such information as the SEC determines necessary “for
the protection of investors”).
105. See 2004 Rule, supra note 101.
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Under the previous Form 8-K regime, companies were required to report very few significant corporate events. The limited number of Form
8-K disclosure items permitted a public company to delay disclosure of
many significant events until the due date for its next periodic report.
During such a delay, the market was unable to assimilate such undisclosed information into the value of a company’s securities. The revisions that we adopt today will benefit markets by increasing the number of unquestionably or presumptively material events that must be
disclosed currently. They will also provide investors with better and
more timely disclosure of important corporate events.106

Thus, the SEC hoped that the 2004 Rule would promote transparency by increasing the frequency and volume of corporate reporting. The current Form 8-K now lists nine Sections containing a total of twenty-two Items that companies must disclose
within four days to their investors and the public.107 Most relevant for the purposes of this Note is Item 2.06: Material Impairments, listed under the Financial Information heading of Section
Two.108 A company triggers this disclosure requirement when it
“concludes that a material charge for impairment to one or more
of its assets, including, without limitation, an impairment of securities or goodwill, is required under generally accepted accounting principles applicable to the company.”109 The broad coverage of this catch-all item110 reflects the SEC’s intent to
encourage corporate transparency in order to protect investors.111
E. MATERIALITY AS THE TOUCHSTONE OF FEDERAL SECURITIES
LAW
Materiality is a familiar concept in securities law, continuously appearing in statutes, regulations, and judicial opinions.

106. Id. at 15,594–95.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 15,601.
109. Id. The company must disclose information including: (1) “impaired asset or assets and the facts and circumstances leading to the conclusion that the
charge for impairment is required;” (2) “the company’s estimate of the amount
or range of amounts of the impairment charge;” and (3) “the company’s estimate
of the amount or range of amounts of the impairment charge that will result in
future cash expenditures.” Id.
110. See infra notes 115–17 and accompanying text.
111. See Proposed 2002 Rule, supra note 97, at 42,915 (discussing the expansion of 8-K requirements and imposition of deadlines throughout history in order to provide investors with “timely, high-quality” information, and noting this
Rule as the latest such expansion).
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Congress incorporated the materiality standard first into the Securities Act,112 and then again one year later, in the Exchange
Act.113 Throughout its course of developing a disclosure framework, the SEC has similarly infused the materiality standard
into rules and regulations.114 Often, the SEC dedicates hundreds
of pages to detailed disclosure requirements, followed by a catchall obligation to disclose “all other material information.”115 Item
2.06: Material Impairments on Form 8-K is one such catch-all.116
Thus, for more than eighty years, materiality has been the
touchstone of securities law, governing the way in which companies must disclose information to the public and investors.117
This Section will provide the most commonly used definition of
materiality and the justifications for this definition’s widespread
adoption.
1. Defining the Standard
In 1973, the U.S. Supreme Court decided TSC Industries,
Inc. v. Northway, Inc. and articulated the definition of materiality that is most commonly accepted today:
An omitted fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a
reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to
vote . . . . Put another way, there must be a substantial likelihood that
the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the rea-

112. Securities Act § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 771q (2012) (declaring it unlawful to
“obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a material fact
or any omission to state a material fact”).
113. Securities Exchange Act § 18(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78r (imposing liability on
any person “who shall make or cause to be made any false and misleading statement of material fact in any application, report, or document filed under the
act”).
114. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b–5 (2018) (governing the selling and purchasing of securities); id. § 243.100 (governing simultaneous disclosure to investment institutions, individual investors, and the public).
115. See, e.g., id. § 240.12b–20 (governing reports, forms and schedules filed
under the Exchange Act); 18 C.F.R. § 385.408 (2018) (governing forms filed under the Securities Act).
116. FORM 8-K, supra note 35, at 2.
117. See BUS. ROUNDTABLE, THE MATERIALITY STANDARD FOR PUBLIC COMPANY DISCLOSURE: MAINTAIN WHAT WORKS 3 (2015) [hereinafter BUSINESS
ROUNDTABLE] (arguing that the concept of materiality has been the “cornerstone” of securities laws since Congress first embedded it in the Securities Act).
The Business Roundtable is an association of chief executive officers collectively
leading companies with more than seven trillion dollars in annual revenues and
more than sixteen million employees. Id. at 1.
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sonable investor as having significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of information made available.118

The Court reaffirmed this standard in Basic v. Levinson, emphasizing that the determination of whether a piece of information
is material is an “inherently fact-specific finding.”119
Subsequently, the SEC and companies subject to SEC regulations have adopted the TSC Industries standard. For example,
in 1982, the SEC amended Rule 405 under the Exchange Act and
expressly adopted the “reasonable investor” materiality standard.120 Companies rely on this definition when preparing annual
and periodic reports under SEC regulations.121 Courts across the
nation have used this standard when determining liability in securities suits.122 This widespread adoption may support relying
on the “reasonable investor” standard when determining materiality in the future.
2. The Reason for the Materiality Standard’s Prominence
The “reasonable investor” standard focuses attention directly on the issue Congress identified in its enactment of the

118. 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). TSC Industries followed the Court’s previous attempt to define materiality in Mills v.
Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970). In Mills, the Court defined material
information as information “of such a character that it might have been considered important by a reasonable shareholder” in the voting process. Id. at 384.
The Court stated that this definition most closely comports with the SEC’s policies in protecting investors and is “fully consistent with Mills.” TSC Indus., 426
U.S. at 449. Some scholars have argued that by leaving Mills intact, the earlier
decision cabined and constrained the latter’s opportunity to define the critical
term. See, e.g., Dale A. Oesterle, The Overused and Under-Defined Notion of
“Material” in Securities Law, 14 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 167, 175–76 (2011) (arguing
that Court should have overruled Mills and “started from scratch”).
119. 485 U.S. 224, 236 (1988) (finding “no valid justification” for excluding
pre-merger talks and insider trading from the TSC Industries definition of materiality). Proxy fraud and insider trading are prohibited by Section 10(b) of the
Exchange Act and the SEC’s Rule 10b–5, respectively. Securities Exchange Act
§ 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2012); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b–5 (2018).
120. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.405, 240.12b–20 (defining materiality as “those matters to which there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor would
attach importance in determining whether to purchase the security registered”).
121. See, e.g., BUS. ROUNDTABLE, supra note 117, at 3 (describing the SEC’s
history of defining materiality).
122. See, e.g., Dalberth v. Xerox Corp., 766 F.3d 172, 183 (2d Cir. 2014) (“To
fulfill the materiality requirement, ‘there must be a substantial likelihood that
the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable
investor as having significantly altered the total mix of information available.’”
(quoting Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231–32 (1988))); Petrie v. Elec.
Game Card, Inc., 761 F.3d 959, 970 (9th Cir. 2014) (same).
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Acts of 1933 and 1934.123 Congress established both these Acts
and the SEC to protect investors and to eliminate unnecessary
speculation from the securities market.124 Writing for the Court
in TSC Industries, Justice Marshall directly acknowledged that
the “reasonable investor” standard must achieve this purpose.125
Before articulating the standard, Justice Marshall clarified that
the court was not just guided by an intent to reach a judicially
fair and equitable outcome, but more importantly, to “ensure disclosures by corporate management in order to enable the shareholders to make an informed choice.”126
Moreover, the “reasonable investor” standard strikes the
balance that the notion of materiality strives to achieve.127 In
TSC Industries, Justice Marshall recognized the danger in a materiality bar that is too low by noting that some information is so
“dubious” that disclosure of such would result only in investor
confusion and excessive corporate compliance costs.128 Thus, in
order to avoid liability under a broad definition of materiality,
companies would be tempted to “bury the shareholders in an avalanche of trivial information[,] a result that is hardly conducive
to informed decisionmaking.”129 Furthermore, issues and concerns become more and less important to shareholders as societal circumstances change. Framing the standard in the perspective of a reasonable investor allows the standard to evolve with
developments in the broader economy.130
While the “reasonable investor” is widely adopted and
achieves several objectives in securities law, it is not without
flaws. The standard often looks backward, assessing materiality
after the fact in a court proceeding with the benefit of additional
123. See supra notes 81–85 and accompanying text (detailing the history and
background of the Securities Act and Exchange Act).
124. See H.R. REP. NO. 73–1383, at 1–2 (1934) (capturing President Roosevelt’s recommendation to Congress to enact legislation—the Exchange Act—to
provide regulation in order to protect investors).
125. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 n.10 (1976) (“In
defining materiality . . . we are, of course, giving content to a rule promulgated
by the SEC pursuant to broad statutory authority to promote ‘the public interest’ and ‘the protection of investors.’” (citations omitted)).
126. Id. at 448.
127. See infra notes 160–64 and accompanying text (discussing the balance
that the materiality standard strikes).
128. TSC Indus., 426 U.S. at 448.
129. Id. at 448–49.
130. See BUS. ROUNDTABLE, supra note 117, at 8 (explaining that the standard provides a “framework for addressing new issues and shedding issues whose
importance has waned”).
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facts, empirical evidence, market reactions, and actual significance to shareholders.131 As there is little guidance beyond the
standard itself, firms and courts may develop their own rules of
thumb to use as thresholds when assessing materiality.132 While
discouraged by the SEC,133 numeric thresholds are difficult to
resist in assessing an ambiguous standard.134 Additionally, this
standard provides large firms with more leeway in interpreting
materiality than it does for small firms.135 A larger firm entails
a larger and more complex “total mix of information,”136 in turn,
raising the threshold at which information will become material.137 This higher threshold then allows larger firms to interpret materiality and to avoid disclosing events with a flexibility

131. See Mitu Gulati et al., Fraud by Hindsight, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 773, 788
(2004) (explaining that when presented with the occurrence of a bad event, a
judge is more likely to determine that a prior event rendered disclosure necessary based on the present knowledge that the event occurred). See generally id.
at 788–91 (discussing hindsight bias as it relates to determinations of materiality). Recent SEC regulations urge entities to focus on expected market reactions
to information, leaving the courts to use price impact as a proxy for materiality.
See Michael J. Kaufman & John M. Wunderlich, Regressing: The Troubling Dispositive Role of Event Studies in Securities Fraud Litigation, 15 STAN. J.L. BUS.
& FIN. 183, 199–201 (2009) (collecting cases that demonstrate that materiality
assessments depend on a showing of post-disclosure price movement).
132. See SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99, 64 Fed. Reg. 45,150, 45,152
(1999), https://www.sec.gov/interps/account/sab99.htm (stating that many companies and auditors use a five percent threshold as a rule of thumb in assessing
materiality); see also Parnes v. Gateway 2000, 122 F.3d 539, 547 (8th Cir. 1997)
(holding that the defendant’s alleged overstatement of assets by $6.8 million—
amounting to two percent of the fast-growing company’s total assets—was not
material because a reasonable investor “would not have been put off by an asset
column that was 2% smaller”).
133. See SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99, 64 Fed. Reg. at 45,151 (stating that numerical thresholds may only be used as an “initial step in assessing
materiality” and further, that materiality cannot be reduced to a quantitative
formula). The SEC Staff elaborates, explaining that the totality of circumstances must be accounted for, including both quantitative and qualitative considerations. Id.
134. See, e.g., Sarah Johnson, SEC, PCAOB Pushed to Define Materiality,
CFO (June 20, 2007), http://ww2.cfo.com/accounting-tax/2007/06/sec-pcaob
-pushed-to-define-materiality (discussing auditors’ desires for the SEC to establish quantitative measures for materiality).
135. See generally George S. Georgiev, Too Big to Disclose: Firm Size and
Materiality Blindspots in Securities Regulation, 64 UCLA L. REV. 602, 625–42
(2017) (demonstrating, in the context of certain disclosure areas, how materiality provides larger firms with greater flexibility in assessing materiality).
136. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).
137. See Georgiev, supra note 135, at 625 (“The size and complexity of large
firms gives them a much larger ‘total mix,’ which—in turn—sets a very high
threshold for what should . . . be disclosed.”).
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unavailable to smaller firms.138 Despite these flaws, however,
materiality and the TSC Industries standard remain prominent
in the realm of corporate disclosure law.
The SEC embodies materiality as a guidepost for regulating
in response to shareholder interests and changing externalities,
and ultimately, in fulfilling the purposes of disclosure law. The
agency’s mandate from Congress to adopt regulations in the face
of market changes in combination with its administrative flexibility allows the SEC to explicitly impose disclosure regulations
relating to content data breaches. The remainder of this Note
argues that the SEC should take such action via a rule, rather
than a standard.
II. A RULE—RATHER THAN A STANDARD—OF
MATERIALITY
Part I of this Note discussed the SEC’s authority to mandate
corporate disclosures, the purposes the SEC aims to promote
through such mandates, and the standard it often uses to trigger
disclosure. Part II challenges the use of a standard, arguing instead for a bright line rule which will provide clarity by requiring
that companies disclose content data breaches. This Part first
briefly discusses the distinction between a standard and a rule
before examining contexts in which the SEC has elected to use a
rule, as opposed to its familiar standard, to establish an event’s
materiality. Finally, this Part concludes that a rule is better
suited to establish a content data breach’s materiality.
A. RULE OR STANDARD: THE DISTINCTION
The decision—and its accompanying tradeoffs—between a
rule and a standard is a familiar topic in legal literature.139 The
difference between the two is in large part a degree of specificity.
138. See id. at 609 (explaining that this size discrepancy may result in an
unfair competitive advantage to larger firms, who, for example, may be able to
acquire a small company for an “immaterial” value, therefore avoiding disclosure and gaining advantage over a smaller firm, who, by doing the same, would
be required to disclose such acquisition).
139. See generally, e.g., Michael Coenen, Rules Against Rulification, 124
YALE L.J. 644 (2014); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic
Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in
Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976); Pierre Schlag, Rules
and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379 (1985); Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term—Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106
HARV. L. REV. 22 (1992); Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CALIF. L.
REV. 953 (1995).
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Rules are bright-line: they provide explicit guidance, leaving little room for future improvisation.140 Standards, on the other
hand, are flexible: they require particular application, ebbing
and flowing with differing sets of facts and circumstances.141
Rules embody specificity. When Congress, the Supreme
Court, or an administrative agency enacts a rule, they create
uniformity, enhance predictability, and decrease the cost of decision making.142 To that end, rules prevent “official arbitrariness.”143 A rule can either prohibit or require conduct—such as
requiring disclosure of content data breaches. This bright-line
clarity prevents entities, such as judges, from arbitrarily finding
the regulated actors either complied with or violated the rule in
any given circumstance.144 Relatedly, if regulated parties know
with certainty what conduct is prohibited or required, and therefore, what conduct violates the rule, they are better able and
more likely to conform their conduct to the rule’s prescription.145
Additionally, this decreases compliance costs, often incurred in
the form of legal fees.146
Rules, however, lack flexibility. For example, when the SEC
issues a rule rather than a standard, it prohibits itself from developing and shaping that rule with time.147 This sacrifices the
ability to apply case-specific precision in order to best promote
the goals and purposes underlying the rule.148 Such a lack of precision often leads to over- and under-inclusion.149 Additionally, a
rule is costly to enact, requiring a much greater investment in
140. See Sullivan, supra note 139, at 58 (stating that a “legal directive is
‘rule’-like when it binds a decisionmaker to respond in a determinate way to the
presence of delimited triggering facts”).
141. See id. (stating that a “legal directive is ‘standard’-like when it tends to
collapse decisionmaking back into the direct application of the background principle or policy to a fact situation”).
142. See Coenen, supra note 139, at 652 (noting that a rule “falls toward the
high end of the specificity spectrum”).
143. See Kennedy, supra note 139, at 1688 (“[R]ules . . . are the restraint of
official arbitrariness . . . .”).
144. Id.
145. Id. at 1688–89 (“[I]f private actors can know in advance the incidence
of official intervention, they will adjust their activities in advance to take account of them.”).
146. See Kaplow, supra note 139, at 571–72 (discussing the cost of legal advice under rules versus standards).
147. See Coenen, supra note 139, at 646 (explaining that standards permit
“nuance, flexibility, and case-specific deliberation”).
148. See Kennedy, supra note 139, at 1689 (noting that rules lack case-specific deliberation).
149. Id.
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resources to determine the appropriate threshold at which to impose liability.150 These drawbacks simultaneously function as
the benefits of a standard.
When Congress, the Supreme Court, or an administrative
agency sets forth a standard, they allow space for future considerations and the ability to decide issues on a case-by-case basis.151 Common examples of standards are reasonableness, due
care, fairness, good faith, and—most importantly for this Note’s
purposes—materiality.152 The generality of a standard allows its
initial enactment to remain broad, covering wide subject matter
and leaving gaps for future adjudications to fill with nuanced
guidance.153 In this endeavor, a judge will assess particular facts
in terms of the purposes or social values underlying the standard, striving to avoid over- and under-inclusion.154 This approach
is particularly effective when “the range of relevant variables is
very wide and [] rigidly rule-bound decisions could produce much
error and injustice.”155 Standards, however, entail high compliance costs, uncertainty, and unpredictability—each of which, a
rule counters.156 Nonetheless, due to the broad factors relevant
to the securities market, the SEC has often opted to issue standards, rather than rules, in its regulatory efforts.
B. RULE OR STANDARD: WHEN AND WHERE FOR THE SEC
The SEC has embedded a materiality standard into much of
its regulatory framework.157 Like most standards, materiality is
often a facts and circumstances analysis.158 Through this approach, the SEC strives to strike a balance between over- and
150. See Kaplow, supra note 139, at 577–78 (explaining that “[r]ules cost
more to promulgate” than standards).
151. See Coenen, supra note 139, at 646 (explaining that standards permit
“nuance, flexibility, and case-specific deliberation”).
152. Kennedy, supra note 139, at 1688.
153. See id. at 1689 (describing the purpose of a general standard).
154. Id.
155. Sunstein, supra note 139, at 993.
156. Coenen, supra note 139, at 649 (elaborating on the pros and cons of
rules and standards).
157. See supra notes 113–17 and accompanying text (describing the “reasonable investor” standard).
158. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 450 (1976) (declaring
that materiality involves “the application of a legal standard to a particular set
of facts”); see also Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 236 (1988) (noting that materiality turns on the facts (quoting TSC Indus., 426 U.S. at 450)); Justin Indus.,
Inc. v. Choctaw Sec., 920 F.2d 262, 267 (5th Cir. 1990) (“In general, materiality
is a question reserved to the fact-finder.”); Sioux, Ltd., Sec. Litig. v. Coopers &
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under-disclosure by limiting disclosure to relevant information.159 This avoids excessively burdening companies, which
practically cannot be expected to disclose every bit of known information.160 More importantly, this balance also ensures that
investors are not overwhelmed with a surplus of irrelevant information.161 Additionally, the materiality standard is flexible,
allowing the SEC and the judicial system to adapt to changing
societal and economic concerns.162 It further allows companies to
tailor the standard to their relevant industry and circumstances.163 This flexibility is critical for the SEC to effectively
regulate the securities market, which is a dynamic and evolving
space.164 These justifications underlie the standard present in
several SEC regulations, including the 2004 Rule.165
However, the SEC has declared particular events and categories of information as exceptions to this materiality standard,
instead providing for a rule in these contexts of corporate disclosures. The rules provide clarity in these particular contexts by
Lybrand, 914 F.2d 61, 65–66 (5th Cir. 1990) (same) (quoting TSC Indus., 426
U.S. at 450); Michaels v. Michaels, 767 F.2d 1185, 1196 (7th Cir. 1985) (explaining the test for materiality is an objective one (citing TSC Indus., 426 U.S. at
445)); Thomas v. Duralite Co., 524 F.2d 577, 581, 584–85 (3d Cir. 1975) (noting
that materiality turns on the facts); Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 642 (7th
Cir. 1963) (analyzing specific facts to determine materiality).
159. See Kennedy, supra note 139, at 1689 (discussing the need for balanced
rules).
160. See Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1041 (D.C. Cir.
1979) (articulating the SEC’s argument that required disclosure of immaterial
information would burden companies with unmanageable disclosure expectations and would “significantly increase the costs to all involved without . . . corresponding benefits to investors generally”).
161. See Mary Jo White, Chair, SEC, A.A. Sommer, Jr. Corporate Securities
and Financial Law Lecture: The Importance of Independence (Oct. 3, 2013),
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch100113mjw#.VEasLvnF98E (“When disclosure gets to be too much or strays from its core purposes, it can lead to ‘information overload’ . . . mak[ing] it difficult for investors to focus on information
that is material and most relevant to their decision-making as investors in our
financial markets.”).
162. See BUS. ROUNDTABLE, supra note 117, at 6–7, 14 (explaining that the
definition of materiality may evolve overtime, and therefore, that when a societal concern becomes material, “disclosure of that information is already required”).
163. Id. at 6 (stating that the flexibility of the materiality standard allows
its definition to vary according to the unique characteristics of each individual
company).
164. See generally H.R. REP. NO. 73–1383, at 5–6 (1934) (describing the
evolving nature of the securities market).
165. See supra notes 114–17 and accompanying text (listing several SEC regulations that use the “reasonable investor” standard).
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requiring that companies always disclose such events and information upon occurrence.166 For example, the SEC requires companies that use conflict minerals in the manufacture of its products to disclose whether those minerals originated in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo or an adjoining country.167 Additionally, companies that perform resource extraction must report any payments relating to commercial oil, natural gas, or
mineral development made to a foreign government or the Federal Government as a party of their annual disclosures.168 Finally, the SEC requires companies to disclose the median of the
annual total compensation of all employees and the annual total
compensation of the company’s CEO.169 In each instance, the
SEC provides explicit guidance to facilitate compliance.170 For
example, in the conflict minerals rule, the agency explicitly defines “conflict mineral,” listing four minerals and their derivatives.171
These bright-line rules demonstrate the SEC’s ability to regulate in response to congressional intent, shareholder interests,
and external events.172 In each case, federal officials determined
that disclosures addressing societal concerns—such as international relations or disproportionate executive pay—should be
made available to all shareholders. While these rules require the
SEC to make a larger initial investment in order to provide the
higher level of specificity, this greatly reduces the ambiguity and
uncertainty as companies prepare their annual reports.173 Moreover, scholars continue to urge the SEC to expand this pool of
exceptions to include information such as a company’s CEO’s
health information.174 This trend, in combination with the SEC’s

166. These requirements have been promoted by mandatory legislation from
Congress, but nonetheless demonstrate that specific disclosure requirements
are within the SEC’s scope of authority.
167. Conflict Minerals, 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249b (2018).
168. Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers, 17 C.F.R. pts.
240, 249b.
169. Pay Ratio Disclosure, 17 C.F.R. pts. 229, 249.
170. But see BUS. ROUNDTABLE, supra note 117, at 1–2 (arguing that deviations from a facts-and-circumstances assessment of materiality wastes SEC resources and buries shareholders in excessive immaterial information).
171. Conflict Minerals, 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249b.
172. See supra Part I.B (describing the factors that influence the SEC).
173. See supra notes 146, 150 and accompanying text (noting the costs and
benefits of rules).
174. See Tom C. W. Lin, Undressing the CEO: Disclosing Private, Material
Matters of Public Company Executives, 11 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 383, 383–85 (2009)
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willingness to enact rules in certain contexts, implies that the
agency may enact a rule in the context of content data breaches.
The next Section describes the benefits of a rule requiring disclosure of content data breaches.
C. THE RATIONALE FOR A RULE IN THIS CONTEXT
Data breaches are speculative and occur frequently, causing
confusion for companies and difficulty for the SEC in regulating
companies—confusion and difficulty that could be eliminated by
subjecting breaches to required disclosure. The rate of content
data breaches is increasing at an alarming pace.175 Today, nearly
all companies rely on data to grow their business, to improve
their products or services, to better understand their customer
bases, or to gain insight and manage increasing market complexity and volatility through analytics.176 In this data-dependent
climate, experts believe a company’s likelihood of experiencing a
data breach is now “inevitable.”177 Companies are increasing
(explaining why a CEO’s health is material); see also James D. Redwood, Qualitative Materiality Under the SEC Proxy Rules and the Fifth Amendment: A Disclosure Accident Waiting to Happen or Two Ships Passing in the Night? 1992
WIS. L. REV. 315, 315 (1992) (arguing that the SEC should require disclosure of
un-adjudicated illegal activity under the materiality standard). See generally
Letter from Dorothy Donohue, Deputy Gen. Counsel, Sec. Regulation of Inv. Co.
Inst., to Brent J. Fields, Sec’y, SEC (May 15, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/
comments/s7-01-17/s70117-1751450-151844.pdf (responding to the SEC’s proposed rule—requiring companies to disclose all material financial obligations,
including “default[s] or similar events”—and arguing that the term “event”
should specifically include “all defaults, accelerations, terminations, [and] modifications” rather than events that “reflect financial difficulties,” as proposed by
the SEC). The proposed rule referenced in the letter was 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2
–12.
175. See supra notes 37–40 and accompanying text.
176. See Hugo Moreno, Data Analytics Is No Longer a Nice Option—It’s the
Core of the Enterprise, FORBES (June 12, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
forbesinsights/2017/06/12/data-analytics-is-no-longer-a-nice-option-its-the-core
-of-the-enterprise/#60c0261677ec (surveying and analyzing responses from
more than 300 executives across the world and finding that demand for data
insights is increasing across all major industries and disciplines).
177. Kyle Balluck, Corporate Data Breaches ‘Inevitable,’ Expert Says, THE
HILL (Nov. 30, 2014), https://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/225550
-cybersecurity-expert-data-breaches-inevitable (recounting an interview with
Dave DeWalt, the CEO of Fire Eye—a leading cybersecurity company—stating
that ninety-seven percent of all companies are getting breached). DeWalt further stated that hackers are “going to get in . . . But don’t let them access the
information that’s really important. Don’t let them get back out with that information. Detect it sooner. Respond sooner. And ultimately that exposure is very
small.” Id. See also Peters, supra note 50 (quoting a former assistant chief litigation counsel to the SEC, Matt Rossi, saying, “in the reality that we live in
now, cyber breaches are going to be increasingly common”).
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spending on cybersecurity programs, and investing resources
aimed at continual oversight of such programs, but these efforts
still do not eliminate the risk of a breach.178 Charles Kallenbach,
a cybersecurity expert and the General Counsel at Heartland
Payment Systems, likens a company’s database to a nice car,
such that companies may lock their databases and hide the keys,
yet nothing will keep a persistent thief away.179
The speculative substance and form of data breaches, however, render them difficult for companies to manage and for the
SEC to regulate.180 Given the certainty of a breach occurring, the
uncertainty that currently exists in how to appropriately respond to a breach is a cause for concern. Consider Equifax: after
discovering its breach, the company dedicated forty days to determining the breach’s scope and damage, before disclosing the
intrusion to Equifax shareholders and to the public.181 This investigation is largely the product of a materiality standard,
which allows for such flexibility in deciding whether to disclose
the breach. Requiring disclosure in this context both reflects the
benefits of a rule in general182 and remedies the harms of the

178. See Balluck, supra note 177 (quoting DeWalt [Fire Eye’s CEO], saying,
“[t]his isn’t a lack of effort. Most companies are growing their security spend”);
see also Joshua Vaughn, Into the Breach: Midstate Experts Say Data Breaches
Are Inevitable, SENTINEL (July 20, 2014), https://cumberlink.com/news/local/
into-the-breach-midstate-experts-say-data-breaches-are-inevitable/article_
6c14ae56-0ebd-11e4-b51c-0019bb2963f4.html (stating that consumer desire for
convenience in online shopping and banking has resulted in a state in which
breaches and identity theft are inevitable); Jennifer Williams-Alvarez, At ACC
Event, Experts Say Data Breaches Are Inevitable. So Now What?, CORP. COUNS.
(Apr. 14, 2016), https://www.law.com/corpcounsel/almID/1202754933830 (describing: (1) the Association of Corporate Counsel’s (ACC’s) state of cybersecurity report, which found that fifty-six percent of companies are allocating more
money to cybersecurity; and (2) a cybersecurity panel from the ACC’s mid-year
meeting, at which a panelist stated that “[d]espite the increased awareness of
cybersecurity issues, a lot of attacks are still pretty much impossible to prevent”).
179. Williams-Alvarez, supra note 178. Kallenbach continued with his analogy, stating that his job as an attorney is “to make the neighbor’s car look more
attractive to take than our car,” and urged corporations to take every possible
minimal step to protect and to prioritize its data. Id.
180. See Shawn E. Tuma, Why Do Data Breach Disclosures Take So Long?
Let’s Ask the SEC Chairman, MIS TRAINING INST. (Nov. 13, 2017), https://misti
.com/infosec-insider/why-do-data-breach-disclosures-take-so-long-let-s-ask-the
-sec-chairman (explaining that companies need “time, effort, and good forensics”
to determine the effect of a data breach).
181. See supra notes 14–15 and accompanying text.
182. See supra notes 142–46 and accompanying text.
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materiality standard as specifically applied to corporate disclosure law.183
Rules generally increase certainty, decrease official arbitrariness, and provide notice to regulated parties.184 Accordingly, a rule requiring disclosure in this context would increase
certainty and guidance, thereby eliminating the confusion, and
facilitate regulated actors’ compliance. It would prevent arbitrary delays in regulated companies’ disclosure following a
breach.185 To this end, the rule is specific. A company need not
disclose every intrusion into its technological domain. As set
forth in the Introduction, this Note defines a content data breach
as one that compromises at least one thousand records containing consumers’ personally identifiable information.186 This specificity is similar to the SEC’s rule that explicitly defines “conflict
mineral,” listing four minerals and their derivatives.187 In both
cases—the existing rule and this Note’s proposed rule—the specificity narrows and focuses the rule’s applicability, which minimizes potential imprecision.188
Additionally, a rule in this context remedies the concerns of
the materiality standard in corporate reporting. The “reasonable
investor” standard provides an opportunity for hindsight bias in
litigation, the creation of judicial and corporate numerical “rules
of thumb,” and unequal discretion among firms of different
sizes.189 This rule provides a forward-looking prescription, preventing reliance on additional facts that are otherwise relied
upon in litigation, such as empirical evidence, market reactions,
and actual significance to the shareholders.190 For example, in
litigation surrounding the fifty-state class action recently filed
against Equifax, the court has the ability to reason based off of
the actually incurred consequences of the breach.191 These consequences include the thirty-three percent fall in share price, the
183. See supra notes 131–38 and accompanying text.
184. See supra Part II.A.
185. See Karen Freifeld, U.S. Companies Allowed to Delay Disclosure of Data
Breaches, THOMSON REUTERS (Jan. 16, 2014), https://www.reuters.com/article/
us-target-data-notification/u-s-companies-allowed-to-delay-disclosure-of-data
-breaches-idUSBREA0F1LO20140116.
186. See supra text accompanying note 27.
187. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
188. See Kennedy, supra note 139, at 1690 (“[T]he wider the scope of the rule,
the more serious the imprecision becomes.”).
189. See supra notes 131–38 and accompanying text.
190. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
191. See Tara Swaminatha, Equifax Now Hit with a Rare 50-State ClassAction Lawsuit, CSO (Nov. 22, 2017), https://www.csoonline.com/article/
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allegations of insider trading, and the shareholders’ determination of significance,192 each of which is largely irrelevant in litigating the violation of a rule.193
Finally, a rule in this context creates an absolute threshold,
in turn, removing firms’ and courts’ undesirable tendency to develop their own rule-of-thumb thresholds for materiality under
the “reasonable investor” standard.194 This further prevents “official arbitrariness” in justifying delays or determining liability.195 A rule provides an equal disclosure requirement for all
firms, regardless of its size and “total mix” of information.196 This
would prevent larger firms from enjoying greater flexibility than
smaller companies in deciding when and whether to report a
data breach.197
Companies today are often global entities, as the internet
allows an international presence from a local base.198 The speculative nature of data breaches—in both a breach’s scope and
source and in whether or not to disclose—in combination with a
patchwork of state reporting regulations199 and a vague federal
reporting standard results in confusion. This confusion is then
reflected in a company’s reporting conduct. The SEC has
acknowledged this confusion and attempted to provide guidance
twice in the past, to no avail.

3238076/data-breach/equifax-now-hit-with-a-rare-50-state-class-action-lawsuit
.html (discussing the details of the complaint); see also supra note 24 and accompanying text.
192. See supra notes 2, 16–19 and accompanying text.
193. See Sunstein, supra note 139, at 962.
194. See supra notes 132–34 and accompanying text.
195. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
196. See supra notes 137–38 and accompanying text.
197. See supra notes 135–38 and accompanying text.
198. See Nataly Kelly, Taking Your Brand Global Is Easier than You Think,
HARV. BUS. REV. (Aug. 23, 2013), https://hbr.org/2013/08/taking-your-brand
-global-is-ea (describing the process of going global as a “path,” rather than an
“obstacle course”).
199. See, e.g., Andrea Peterson, Privacy Advocates: A National Data Breach
Notification Standard Might Actually Make Things Worse, WASH. POST (Jan.
12, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2015/01/12/
privacy-advocates-a-national-data-breach-notification-standard-might-actually
-make-things-worse/?utm_term=.9dadcab2c500 (explaining that today, fortyseven states have enacted security breach notification laws).
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D. EXISTING GUIDANCE IS INSUFFICIENT
In 2011, the SEC issued guidance to address this confusion,
instructing companies to discuss cybersecurity threats and incidents in management’s discussion and analysis of financial condition and results of operations (MD&A)200—a section of their
annual reports.201 In reality, the SEC’s guidance statement contained only abstract direction202 and proved relatively ineffective
in subsequent corporate reporting.203 Even with perfect compliance, a company may wait several months before disclosing a
data breach at their next annual filing, such as Equifax’s fortyday delay.204 During that waiting time, the company is incurring
excessive costs to remediate the breach and increase security, as
well as diverting resources toward the breach which otherwise
may be directed toward furthering other business objectives.205
On February 26, 2018, the SEC released additional guidance to address the disclosure of data breaches.206 The guidance
acknowledged several concerns and recognized several costs of
data breaches that this Note has described.207 Furthermore, the
200. See id.
201. See Commission Guidance Regarding Management’s Discussion and
Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations, 68 Fed. Reg. 75,056,
75,056 (Dec. 29, 2003) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 231 and 241) (stating that
MD&A requirements are intended to satisfy three objectives: “[(1)] To provide a
narrative explanation of a company’s financial statements that enables investors to see the company through the eyes of management; [(2)] [t]o enhance the
overall financial disclosure and provide the context within which financial information should be analyzed; and [(3)] [t]o provide information about the quality of, and the potential variability of, a company’s earnings and cash flow, so
that investors can ascertain the likelihood that past performance is indicative
of future performance.”).
202. See Press Release, SEC, supra note 49 (acknowledging that the 2011
guidance statement was “principles based”).
203. See Freifeld, supra note 185 (quoting a former acting assistant attorney
general at the U.S. Justice Department saying that since the 2011 guidance
document was issued, “companies have tended to include generic risk factors
rather than disclose specific incidents”); see also, e.g., Laura Northrup, Did Yahoo Wait Too Long to Disclose Massive 2014 Data Breach? SEC Investigating,
CONSUMERIST (Jan. 23, 2017), https://consumerist.com/2017/01/23/did-yahoo
-wait-too-long-to-disclose-massive-2014-data-breach-sec-investigating (reporting that Yahoo experienced breaches in 2013 and 2014, but failed to disclose the
breaches until 2016).
204. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
205. See supra Part III.B (discussing the negative impacts of a data breach
on a company).
206. Commission Statement and Guidance on Public Company Cybersecurity Disclosures, 83 Fed. Reg. 8166, 8166 (Feb. 26, 2018) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. pts. 229 and 249) [hereinafter 2018 Guidance].
207. Id. at 8166–67.
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guidance explains that a cybersecurity incident’s materiality depends upon the incident’s nature, extent and potential magnitude, as well as the incident’s range of potential harm to a company’s reputation, financial performance, and customer and
vendor relationships.208 Although perhaps more specific than the
2011 guidance, this direction does not provide any more clarity
than what previously existed. Instead, it lists every obvious factor that could be relevant to a company’s decision to disclose a
data breach, and instructs the company to “make appropriate
disclosure timely and sufficiently prior to the offer and sale of
securities.”209
Despite its recognizing the gravity of data breaches, the
2018 guidance leniently concedes that determining the implications of a cybersecurity incident may require time, thus excusing
reporting delays such as Equifax’s forty-day delay.210 In sum,
this guidance kicks the can down the road. It encourages companies to continue reporting data breaches in the manner in which
they are already reporting.211 Importantly, however, one of these
manners is the Form 8-K, which the SEC “encourages companies
to continue to use” to report cybersecurity incidents.212 In the
guidance, the SEC states that it continues to “consider other
means of promoting appropriate disclosure of cyber incidents.”213
One such means, providing the most appropriate disclosure, is a
rule mandating disclosure of content data breaches on a Form 8K, a vehicle of disclosure that the SEC has now formally endorsed.
III. THE RULE IN PRACTICE: PROTECTING INVESTORS
AND PROMOTING TRANSPARENCY
This Part explores the details of the rule and its potential
impact. It argues that required disclosure of content data
breaches furthers the purposes of corporate disclosure laws and
promotes informed investment by increasing transparency. Finally, this Part addresses likely concerns with the proposed rule.

208. Id. at 8169.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 8168–69 (providing examples of current content data breach reporting options).
212. Id. at 8168.
213. Id. at 8167.
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A. THE RULE
This Note proposes the following rule: companies subject to
SEC regulations must disclose content data breaches as material
impairments within four days of discovery by way of the SEC’s
Form 8-K (hereinafter referred to as the Content Data Breach
Disclosure Rule, or CDBD Rule). For purposes of this Note “content data breach” is defined as a data breach that has compromised at least one thousand records containing consumers’ personally identifiable information.
Several definitions of a data breach exist, though all are variations of a theme describing a “confirmed incident in which sensitive, confidential or otherwise protected data has been accessed
and/or disclosed in an unauthorized fashion.”214 The CDBD Rule
embraces the notions of unauthorized access and compromised
data, while quantitatively limiting the scope of the rule’s applicability. The limitation recognizes the reality that data
breaches are not always dramatic infiltrations by malicious
hackers.215 The numerical threshold—1000 records—aims to
eliminate the risk of requiring company disclosure for day-to-day
breaches.216 As mentioned in the Introduction, this number
comes from a Ponemon Institute study, sponsored by IBM Security, (hereinafter referred to as the “Ponemon Study”) that defines a material data breach as “one that involves a minimum of
1,000 lost or stolen records containing personal information
about consumers or customers.”217 The Ponemon Study is wellrespected and often cited by technology companies and cybersecurity experts when discussing various aspects of data
breaches.218 Nonetheless, this number remains a somewhat arbitrary threshold, and thus provides an opportunity for future
work and input from cybersecurity experts.
214. Data Breach, TECHTARGET, https://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/
definition/data-breach (last visited Mar. 10, 2019); see also, e.g., Data Breach,
TREND MICRO, https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/security/definition/data
-breach (last visited Mar. 10, 2019) (defining data breach as “an incident where
information is stolen or taken from a system without the knowledge or authorization of the system’s owner”).
215. See TECHTARGET, supra note 214 (explaining that a hack can be as innocent as an unauthorized hospital employee reading a patient’s health information over the shoulder of an authorized hospital employee).
216. See id.
217. PONEMON STUDY, supra note 27, at 2.
218. See, e.g., Michael Bruemmer, Data Breach Resolution Grp., Vice President, Survey—Most Companies Ill-Prepared for a Global Data Breach, EXPERIAN (June 27, 2017), http://www.experian.com/blogs/data-breach/2017/06/
27/survey-companies-ill-prepared-global-data-breach/; New Study: Data Theft

2019]

MATERIAL BREACH & DISCLOSURE

2127

Personally identifiable information (PII) is a familiar concept throughout privacy law, including state data breach notification laws.219 The CDBD Rule takes advantage of this familiarity, defining PII as “any piece of information which can
potentially be used to uniquely identify, contact, or locate a single person.”220 This can include street addresses, device IP addresses, phone numbers, social security numbers, driver’s licenses, and vehicle registrations.221 PII’s presence throughout
federal and state laws captures its general acceptance as an appropriate benchmark in the technological domain.222 Additionally, the Ponemon Study employs PII in its definition of “data
breach,” demonstrating the cybersecurity industry’s acceptance
of this term.223
In sum, the CDBD Rule incorporates recognized and appropriate terms and definitions. This familiarity prevents the rule
from surprising corporations. Companies can measure one thousand records and identify records containing PII. This ultimately
reflects the benefits of a rule-based approach, replacing uncertain reporting standards with concrete definitions and thresholds.224 Moreover, the rule itself operates to protect investors and
increase transparency, ultimately achieving the purposes of corporate disclosure.

Rising Sharply, Insider Threats Cited as Leading Cause, VARONIS (Aug. 9,
2016), http://ir.varonis.com/news-releases/news-release-details/new-study-data
-theft-rising-sharply-insider-threats-cited.
219. See, e.g., Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 6501–6506 (2012); Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, 18 U.S.C. § 2710
(1988); Standards for the Protection of Personal Information of Residents of the
Commonwealth, 201 MASS. CODE REGS. § 17.00–.05 (2010).
220. Financial Services Compliance, INTRUSION, http://www.intrusion.com/
index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=29&Itemid=40 (last visited
Mar. 10, 2019).
221. See id.
222. See Paul M. Schwartz & Daniel J. Solove, The PII Problem: Privacy and
a New Concept of Personally Identifiable Information, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1814,
1819–21 (2011) (discussing the rise of PII’s significance throughout the last fifty
years).
223. See PONEMON STUDY, supra note 27, at 2.
224. See supra Part II.A.
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B. PROTECTING INVESTORS BY ACKNOWLEDGING SHAREHOLDER
HARM
The SEC was created in order to advance the purposes of the
Securities Act and the Exchange Act.225 These Acts aim to promote transparency in order to enhance informed investments,
and ultimately, to protect the investors.226 Purchasing stock is
one vehicle for the public to invest in a company.227 As such, a
company’s stock share price is a direct reflection of a shareholder’s investment, and thus, his or her interest.228 While an
increase in share price benefits the shareholder, a decrease in
share price harms the shareholder. When this harm is created
or accompanied by a lack of corporate transparency, it offends
and runs counter to the purposes of the Securities Act and the
Exchange Act. Content data breaches are corporate events that
often decrease a company’s stock price. Therefore, shareholder
harm resulting from content data breaches requires SEC remediation. The CDBD Rule serves as such remediation.
The effects of a content data breach, including direct and indirect costs, were discussed in Part I, above.229 These types of
damages and harms trigger disclosure under Form 8-K. In the
2004 Rule, the SEC states that Item 2.06 requires disclosure
when a company concludes that there has been a “material
charge for impairment to one or more of its assets, including,
without limitation, an impairment of securities or goodwill.”230 A
content data breach impairs both securities, evidenced by an immediate and extended decrease in stock price and direct costs of
a data breach,231 and goodwill, evidenced through the indirect
costs of a data breach.232 These impairments harm shareholders
directly—by decreasing the value of the company233—and indirectly—by diverting costs from growth or strategic progress, and
decreasing shareholder trust.

225. See supra Part I.A.
226. See supra notes 80–85 and accompanying text.
227. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
228. See Mauboussin, supra note 77.
229. See supra Part I.A; see also Mark S. Johnson et al., Stock Price Reaction
to Data Breaches, 16 J. FIN. ISSUES 1, 11 (2017) (finding an average .37% decrease in firm equity value following a data breach).
230. 2004 Rule, supra note 101 (emphases added).
231. See supra notes 41–65 and accompanying text.
232. See supra notes 66–71 and accompanying text.
233. See Brian Palmer, Watch Out for Falling Stock Prices, SLATE (Aug. 9,
2011), https://www.slate.com/news-and-politics/2011/08/does-it-matter-to-a
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Considering that corporate disclosures strive to protect investors, these harms should be reported as early as possible. To
be clear, this Note does not take the position that the CDBD Rule
will necessarily remedy the costs of a data breach, but rather
that these costs harm investors, and thus, a company is obligated to inform its investors of a content data breach. Historically, the SEC has acted to protect investors in response to external events that make certain information more relevant to a
company’s shareholders.234 The era of content data breaches,
and its corresponding effect on shareholder interests, is precisely
the type of event that should trigger SEC action.
C. PROMOTING INFORMED INVESTMENT BY INCREASING
CORPORATE TRANSPARENCY
The CDBD Rule would resolve existing confusion and concern among companies, attorneys, and accountants regarding cybersecurity-related disclosure.235 The Form 8-K requires companies to report material impairments within four days of a
triggering event.236 When the SEC amended Form 8-K in 2004,
the agency expanded the Form’s scope in order to prevent the
delayed disclosure that existed under the previous Form 8-K,
aiming to benefit investors by “assimilat[ing] such undisclosed
information into the value of a company’s securities.”237 Per the
CDBD Rule, required disclosure within four days would provide
investors with transparency during the company’s entire recovery period. The SEC’s lenient approach may have been appropriate in the past, when the market was first facing concerns related to cybersecurity incidents, but that time has since
passed.238 Congress established the SEC in order to regulate in

-company-if-its-stocks-lose-value.html (explaining that when a stock price decreases, shareholders “clearly tak[e] a major hit, since they own the stocks”).
234. See supra Part I.B.
235. See CF Disclosure Guidance: Topic No. 2, SEC (Oct. 13, 2011), https://
www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/cfguidance-topic2.htm (“Recently,
there has been increased focus by registrants and members of the legal and accounting professions on how these [cybersecurity] risks and their related impact
on the operations of a registrant should be described within the framework of
the disclosure obligations imposed by the federal securities laws.”).
236. See FORM 8-K, supra note 35, at 2.
237. See 2004 Rule, supra note 101, at 15,594.
238. See Ezequiel Minaya, SEC Says Companies Can Expect New Guidelines
on Reporting Cybersecurity Breaches, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 9, 2017), https://www
.wsj.com/articles/sec-says-companies-can-expect-new-guidelines-on-reporting
-cybersecurity-breaches-1510267201 (describing a senior SEC regulator’s warn-

2130

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[103:2095

accordance with changing times and provided it with the flexibility and resources necessary to target developments such as
the inevitability of data breaches.239
Periodic reporting and Form 8-K allow companies to continually provide the public with important information as it arises.
By creating the CDBD Rule, the SEC would provide transparency with regard to a prominent corporate issue—content data
breaches.240 This transparency may operate to increase investor
confidence in the market,241 in turn, reducing the amount of
speculation relating to cybersecurity incidents.242 Under existing
circumstances, shareholders are largely uncertain of how to respond to data breach and often sell their shares in a panic, attempting to distance themselves from the breached company.243
In this context, mandated disclosure through the CDBD Rule
would reveal the true prevalence of data breaches,244 which perhaps would diminish shareholders’ instinctual hostile reaction
and provide more rational market reactions to data breaches. In
return, this may reduce companies’ resistance to fully and transparently disclosing data breaches in the future, providing more
rational market reactions.
Greater transparency, greater confidence, and reduced speculation would ultimately encourage capital formation, investment, and growth in this country’s economic state.245 Even if
such lofty hopes are unavailing, a rule requiring disclosure of
ing that the “spate of high-profile breaches” has prompted the need for new directions regarding data breach disclosure laws); see also supra notes 37–76 and
accompanying text (discussing the recent increase in cybersecurity incidents).
239. See H.R. REP. NO. 73-1383, at 6–7 (1934) (explaining that despite Congress’s overall desire to limit agency discretion, in securities—“a field where
practices constantly vary”—broad discretion is “practically essential”).
240. See supra notes 175–79 and accompanying text.
241. See H.R. REP. NO. 73-1383, at 11 (“There cannot be honest markets
without honest publicity. Manipulation and dishonest practices of the market
place thrive upon mystery and secrecy.”).
242. See Tuma, supra note 180.
243. See Kvochko & Pant, supra note 41 (stating that shareholders lack both
information about cybersecurity incidents generally and tools to measure the
resulting impact of the breach); accord Daniel J. Solove & Danielle Keats Citron, Risk and Anxiety: A Theory of Data-Breach Harms, 96 TEX. L. REV. 737,
753–54 (2018) (illustrating that the harms of data breaches are difficult to conceptualize and articulating claims that breaches cause consumers anxiety and
emotional distress).
244. See supra notes 175–79 and accompanying text.
245. See What We Do, supra note 78 (explaining that disclosure promotes a
“more active, efficient, and transparent capital market that facilitates the capital formation so important to our nation’s economy”).
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content data breaches nonetheless facilitates informed investing. At a minimum, a rule will provide investors important, relevant information as they navigate the securities market, allowing an investor to form an “intelligent basis for forming his
judgment as to the value of the securities he buys or sells.”246
Thus, the rule facilitates informed investments, which directly
satisfies President Roosevelt’s directive to Congress in 1933,247
and Congress’s hopes for the Exchange Act.248
D. REJECTING OBJECTIONS
Companies often postpone reporting a content data
breach.249 At the time of disclosure, companies justify this delay
by explaining it was investigating and identifying the accurate
scope and damage of the breach, attempting to avoid premature
disclosure.250 In its 2018 guidance, the SEC accepts these investigations and disclosure delays as understandable.251 This argument embodies the speculative nature of content data breaches,
as companies attempt to avoid premature disclosure, preferring
instead to have as many facts as possible before publicly reporting the incident.252 Accordingly, the SEC’s 2004 proposed
amendments to Form 8-K were met with opposition. In response
to Item 2.06, commentators noted that material impairments
“can occur over time, making it difficult to determine the exact
date of the triggering event.”253 Moreover, commentators believed the annual reports were better suited to address these
events, because discussing a single piece of information outside
of the context of the entire financial statements would be “difficult and potentially misleading.”254 The SEC, however, was not
convinced.

246. See H.R. REP. NO. 73-1383, at 11.
247. See supra text accompanying note 80.
248. See H.R. REP. NO. 73-1383, at 5 (listing the causes of “dangerous speculation” in the securities market, including “inadequate corporate reporting
which keeps in ignorance of necessary factors for intelligent judgment of the
values of securities a public continually solicited to buy such securities by the
sheer advertising value of listing”).
249. See infra note 275 and accompanying text.
250. See, e.g., Press Release, Equifax, supra note 9.
251. 2018 Guidance, supra note 206, at 8169.
252. See Tuma, supra note 180 (explaining that preparing disclosures is difficult and subjective, and thus, without adequate time to investigate the facts,
disclosures may be misleading).
253. 2004 Rule, supra note 101, at 15,601.
254. Id.
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The agency responded to these concerns by stating that it
believes it is “important for investors to receive this information
on a current basis.”255 This response reflects Congress’s intent to
prioritize transparency and promote informed investment.256
The SEC further stated that by tying the reporting deadline to
the board’s, a committee’s, or an officer’s discovery of a content
data breach, the timing of disclosure is “sufficiently precise.”257
Over a decade later, the SEC continues to endorse companies’
using a Form 8-K to disclose data breaches.258 Nonetheless, the
SEC acknowledged in its Final 2004 Rule that the discovery of a
data breach can often occur in conjunction with preparing, reviewing, or auditing financial statements during the development of periodic reports.259 Thus, if a company discovers a content data breach while preparing quarterly or annual reports
and it plans to disclose the breach in the relevant report, then
Form 8-K disclosure is not required260 and the CDBD Rule would
not be triggered. Beyond such circumstances, the SEC was, is,
and should be unwilling to sympathize with the commentators’
concerns.
Moreover, existing sources of regulation mitigate commentators’ concerns by demonstrating the capability of rapid disclosure. As the threat and inevitability of data breaches has gained
increased recognition, various regulatory bodies have instituted
reporting deadlines for cybersecurity incidents.261 For example,
Europe’s new General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) establishes a seventy-two hour—or three-day—reporting deadline
for data breaches.262 The GDPR—effective May 25, 2018—requires entities to disclose any discovered breach within seventytwo hours, unless the breach is “unlikely to result in a risk to the
rights and freedoms of natural persons.”263 Similarly, in 2017,

255. Id.
256. See supra Part III.C.
257. 2004 Rule, supra note 101, at 15,601.
258. 2018 Guidance, supra note 206, at 8168.
259. See id.
260. See id.
261. See Freifeld, supra note 185 (describing state disclosure laws, some of
which—including Florida, Vermont, and Wisconsin—have established specific
forty-five-day disclosure deadlines for data breaches).
262. Council Regulation 2016/679, art. 33(1), 2016 O.J. (L 119).
263. Id.; see also GDPR and 72-Hour Breach Reporting: What You Need to
Know, ZONE FOX: BLOG (Apr. 10, 2017), https://www.zonefox.com/blog/gdpr-and
-72-hour-breach-reporting-what-you-need-to-know (explaining the nuts and
bolts of the seventy-two-hour requirement).
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New York became the first state to implement detailed regulations applicable to financial services entities, including banks,
insurance companies, brokers, and others.264 This regulation—
effective March 1, 2017—requires covered entities to take certain proactive measures, including reporting all cybersecurity
events and breaches to the Department of Financial Services
within seventy-two hours.265 Inspired by New York’s regulation,
the National Association of Insurance Commissioners adopted a
seventy-two hour reporting deadline in October, 2017, for any
cybersecurity event resulting in “unauthorized access to, disruption or misuse of, an Information System or information stored
on such Information System.”266
These reporting deadlines not only signal the increased urgency in requiring disclosure of cybersecurity incidents, but also
demonstrate that despite the speculative nature of data
breaches, immediate disclosure is in fact possible. For example
on October 5, 2017, a security expert notified an online commenting system, Disqus, that it had been breached in 2012.267 Within
just twenty-four hours, Disqus had contacted possibly-affected
users and disclosed the breach to the public.268 In the face of new
regulations and reporting deadlines, one can hardly argue that
Disqus is an anomaly, such that its rapid disclosure is not replicable by others. Instead, companies everywhere must likewise
prioritize these reporting responsibilities. As corporations today
can reach further with fewer resources,269 centralized regulation
is likely most effective. Accordingly, the centralized SEC is the
appropriate body to unify corporate reporting practices with regard to content data breaches by way of the CDBD Rule.
CONCLUSION
Corporate disclosure law has historically been viewed as a
framework, or patchwork, of vague requirements, rules, and regulations.270 This view rings true in the field of cybersecurity.
264. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 23, § 500.01 (2018).
265. Id. § 500.17.
266. INSURANCE DATA SECURITY MODEL LAW § 3(D) (NAT’L ASS’N INS.
COMM’RS 2017).
267. See Eduard Kovacs, Disqus Discloses 2012 Breach Impacting 17 Million
Users, SECURITY WK. (Oct. 9, 2017), https://www.securityweek.com/disqus
-discloses-2012-breach-impacting-17-million-users.
268. See id.
269. See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
270. See, e.g., Oesterle, supra note 118, at 168 (stating that the SEC rests
many federal securities laws on the notion of materiality without defining the
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Technology continues to develop and companies continue to incorporate this developing technology into their business and operations. In the face of these developments, the rate of content
data breaches is rising.271 In this field, disclosure is muddied by
an inarticulate standard of materiality, an issue that is engulfing the corporate domain, with no further guidance from the
SEC.272
Content data breaches provide the SEC with the opportunity to resolve a small amount of the overwhelming ambiguity.
They are a discrete issue. They are capable of objective identification. They are destructive. They are material events which
should mandate disclosure to the public. The CDBD Rule, requiring disclosure of content data breaches as material impairments under Item 2.06 of Form 8-K, will increase transparency
in the capital market. This proposition finds its basis in President’s Roosevelt instruction to Congress in 1933 to decrease
speculation in the marketplace.273 It finds support in its advantages in comparison to an unclear standard.274 Finally, this
solution finds its benefit in its practical application—protecting
investors and enhancing informed investment.275 This requirement provides a more secure and reliable market, ultimately
fueling investments and strengthening corporate America.

term, thus leading academics to critique the standard as too vague).
271. See supra notes 37–76 and accompanying text.
272. See supra notes 235–38 and accompanying text.
273. See supra Part I.A.
274. See supra Part II.C.
275. See supra Parts III.B & III.C.

